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 payoff function






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Neural Information Processing Systems

The stochastic multi-armed bandit setting has been recently studied in the nonstationary regime, where the mean payoff of each action is a non-decreasing function of the number of rounds passed since it was last played. This model captures natural behavioral aspects of the users which crucially determine the performance of recommendation platforms, ad placement systems, and more.




Interactive Submodular Bandit

Neural Information Processing Systems

In many machine learning applications, submodular functions have been used as a model for evaluating the utility or payoff of a set such as news items to recommend, sensors to deploy in a terrain, nodes to influence in a social network, to name a few. At the heart of all these applications is the assumption that the underlying utility/payoff function is known a priori, hence maximizing it is in principle possible. In real life situations, however, the utility function is not fully known in advance and can only be estimated via interactions. For instance, whether a user likes a movie or not can be reliably evaluated only after it was shown to her. Or, the range of influence of a user in a social network can be estimated only after she is selected to advertise the product.


Local Aggregative Games

Neural Information Processing Systems

Aggregative games provide a rich abstraction to model strategic multi-agent interactions. We focus on learning local aggregative games, where the payoff of each player is a function of its own action and the aggregate behavior of its neighbors in a connected digraph. We show the existence of a pure strategy epsilon-Nash equilibrium in such games when the payoff functions are convex or sub-modular. We prove an information theoretic lower bound, in a value oracle model, on approximating the structure of the digraph with non-negative monotone sub-modular cost functions on the edge set cardinality. We also introduce gamma-aggregative games that generalize local aggregative games, and admit epsilon-Nash equilibrium that are stable with respect to small changes in some specified graph property. Moreover, we provide estimation algorithms for the game theoretic model that can meaningfully recover the underlying structure and payoff functions from real voting data.